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Abstract
The minority game is a simple congestion game in which the players’ main goal
is to choose among two options the one that is adopted by the smallest number
of players. We characterize the set of Nash equilibria and the limiting behavior of
several well-known learning processes in the minority game with an arbitrary odd
number of players. Interestingly, different learning processes provide considerably
different predictions.
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1 Introduction
Congestion games are ubiquitous in economics. In a congestion game (Rosenthal,
1973), players use several facilities from a common pool. The costs or benefits that a
player derives from a facility depends on the number of users of that facility. A conges-
tion game is therefore a natural game to model scarcity of common resources. Examples
of such systems include vehicular traffic (Nagel et al., 1997), packet traffic in networks
(Huberman and Lukose, 1997), and ecologies of foraging animals (DeAngelis and Gross,
1992). Similar coordination problems are encountered in market entry games (Selten and Gu¨th,
1982).
Congestion games are also interesting from a theoretical point of view. In congestion
games, players need to coordinate to differentiate. This seems to be more difficult than
coordinating on the same action, as any commonality of expectations is broken up. For
instance, when commuters have to choose between two roads A and B and all believe that
the others will choose road A, nobody will choose that road, invalidating beliefs. The
sorting of players predicted in the pure-strategy Nash equilibria of such games violates
the common belief that in symmetric games, all rational players will evaluate the situation
identically, and hence, make the same choices in similar situations (see Harsanyi and Selten,
1988, p. 73). Moreover, in congestion games, players may obtain asymmetric payoffs in
equilibrium which may complicate attainment of equilibrium, as coordination cannot be
achieved through tacit coordination based on historical precedent (cf. Meyer et al., 1992).
Finally, congestion games often have many equilibria, so that players also face the difficulty
of coordinating on the same equilibrium.
Therefore, it is an interesting question what type of behavior game theory predicts
in such games. In this paper, we characterize the equilibria of the minority game, a
simple congestion game based on the El Farol bar problem of Arthur (1994), and we
study the limiting behavior of a number of well-known learning processes for this game.
In the minority game, an odd number of players — to make minorities well-defined —
choose between two ceteris paribus identical alternatives. Congestion is costly, so players
prefer the alternative chosen by the smallest number of players. The minority game is
thus closely related to the market entry game, a game extensively studied in experimental
economics (see the survey of Ochs (1999) and references therein; for a recent contribution
see Duffy and Hopkins (2005)). While the market entry game models situations in which
players can choose between a safe option (staying out of the market) and an alternative
whose payoffs are declining in the number of other players choosing that option (entering),
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the minority game is a suitable model for more symmetric situations in which the payoffs
of both actions depend on the number of other players choosing that action. In such
situations, players will need to outsmart other players, so as to be one step ahead of their
opponents. For instance, the minority game may be a good model for financial markets,
where investors try to identify the underpriced shares, and try to sell the shares they expect
to fall in the future. The minority game has been studied by a number of authors in
economics. Renault et al. (2005) studies repeated play in the game. Bottazzi and Devetag
(2007), Chmura and Pitz (2006), and Helbing et al. (2005) study the game experimentally.
The game has also been studied extensively in the physics literature; see Challet et al.
(2004) or Coolen (2005) for an overview.
Interestingly, we find that the predictions from different learning processes are not
equivocal. While the replicator dynamic predicts that play converges to a Nash equilibrium
with at most one player who chooses a strictly mixed strategy, the set of stationary points
under the perturbed best-response dynamics consists of the logit quantal response equilibria
of the game (McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995).1 For the case of three players, we show that the
set of Nash equilibria that are the limit of a sequence of logit quantal response equilibria
with vanishing noise consists of Nash equilibria with at most one mixer and the Nash
equilibrium in which all players randomize equally over their two actions. Finally, we study
the best-reply learning process with limited memory of Hurkens (1995) and the related
model of Kets and Voorneveld (2005). Hurkens studies a learning model in which players
choose an arbitrary action that is a best reply to some belief over other players’ actions that
is consistent with their recent past play. In the learning model of Kets and Voorneveld,
players also best-reply to beliefs over others’ play supported by recent past play, but in
addition, players additionally display a so-called recency bias: when there are multiple
best replies to a given belief, a player chooses the action that he most recently played. We
show that while the process of Hurkens offers no sharp predictions for the minority game,
the model of Kets and Voorneveld predicts that play converges to one of the pure Nash
equilibria of the game when players have a memory length of at least two periods.
The current paper is related to the literature on learning in congestion games and more gen-
erally learning in potential games (e.g. Hofbauer and Hopkins, 2005; Hofbauer and Sandholm,
2002; Sandholm, 2001, 2007). Papers that study learning in games similar to the game
considered here include Blonski (1999), Franke (2003) and Kojima and Takahashi (2004).
Most of these papers focus on the predictions of a single learning model,2 while we compare
1For a definition of these learning processes, see Section 3 and 4, respectively.
2Duffy and Hopkins (2005) and Kojima and Takahashi (2004) are notable exceptions.
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predictions from different learning models. Moreover, while most results are obtained for
games with either a small number or a continuum of players, we characterize the equilibria
of the game and the limiting behavior of different learning processes for any (odd) number
of players.
The outline of this paper is as follows. In Section 2, we define the game and characterize
its Nash equilibria. In Section 3, we characterize the set of stationary states and the set
of asymptotically stable states under the replicator dynamic. In Section 4, we characterize
the set of stationary states under the perturbed best-response dynamics. In Section 5,
we characterize the limiting behavior in the minority game under the best-reply learning
processes with limited memory. Section 6 concludes.
2 The minority game
2.1 Basic definitions
Following the notation of Tercieux and Voorneveld (2005), we denote the set of players
by N = {1, . . . , 2k + 1}, with k ∈ N. Each player i ∈ N has a set of pure strategies
Ai = {−1,+1}: agents have to choose between two options. The set of mixed strategies of
player i is denoted by ∆(Ai). We denote a mixed strategy profile by α ∈ ×i∈N∆(Ai), and
we use the standard notation α−i ∈ ×j∈N\{i}∆(Aj) to denote a strategy profile of players
other than i ∈ N . With each action a ∈ {−1,+1}, a function
fa : {1, . . . , 2k + 1} → R
can be associated which indicates for each n ∈ {1, . . . , 2k+ 1} the payoff fa(n) to a player
choosing a when the total number of players choosing a equals n. The von Neumann-
Morgenstern utility function of a player is then given by
ui(a) = fai (|{j ∈ N : aj = ai}|) , (2.1)
where a ∈ ×j∈NAj . Payoffs are extended to mixed strategies in the usual way.
The function fa(·), a ∈ {−1,+1} can have several forms. We make the common as-
sumptions (e.g. Challet et al., 2004) that congestion is costly:
[Mon] f−1 and f+1 are strictly decreasing functions,
and that the congestion effect is the same across alternatives:
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[Sym] f−1 = f+1.
We refer to a player who uses a mixed strategy that puts positive probability on both pure
strategies a mixer. A player that puts full probability mass on the alternative −1 is called
a (−1)-player ; similarly, a player that puts full probability mass on the alternative +1 is
called a (+1)-player.
2.2 Nash equilibria
Throughout this section, let k ∈ N and consider a minority game with 2k + 1 players.
We characterize its set of Nash equilibria. The pure Nash equilibria are easy to characterize:
Proposition 2.1. [Tercieux and Voorneveld (2005)] A pure strategy profile is a Nash
equilibrium if and only if one of the alternatives −1 or +1 is chosen by exactly k of the
2k + 1 players.
It remains to characterize the game’s Nash equilibria with at least one mixer.
Lemma 2.2. Let α ∈ ×i∈N∆(Ai) be a Nash equilibrium with a nonempty set of mixers.
All mixers use the same strategy: for all i, j ∈ N , if αi, αj /∈ {(1, 0), (0, 1)}, then αi = αj.
Proof. By [Sym], the 2 × 2 subgame played by two mixers i (row player) and j (column
player) given the strategy profile of the remaining players is of the form
−1 +1
−1 x, x y, z
+1 z, y w, w
where, for instance, y is the payoff to the player choosing −1 if the other player chooses
+1 and the remaining players stick to the mixed strategy profile (αk)k∈N\{i,j}. By [Mon],
a player is better off if the other chooses differently, i.e., x < y and z > w. Let p, q ∈ (0, 1)
denote the equilibrium probability with which player i and j, respectively, choose −1. In
equilibrium, each player must be indifferent between playing +1 and playing −1:
px+ (1− p)y = pz + (1− p)w,
qx+ (1− q)y = qz + (1− q)w.
Subtracting the latter expression from the former yields
(p− q)(x− y) = (p− q)(z − w).
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As x < y and z > w, this can only hold if p = q. Since mixers i and j were chosen
arbitrarily from the set of mixers, this implies that all mixers use the same strategy. 
Since all mixers use the same strategy and player labels are irrelevant by [Sym] (if α
is a Nash equilibrium, so is every permutation of α), a non-pure Nash equilibrium can
be summarized by its type (ℓ, r, λ), where ℓ, r ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 2k + 1} denote the number of
players choosing pure strategy −1 or +1, respectively, and λ ∈ (0, 1) the probability with
which the remaining m(ℓ, r, λ) := (2k + 1) − (ℓ + r) > 0 mixers choose −1. Moreover,
let v−1(ℓ, r, λ) denote the expected payoff to a player choosing −1; v+1(ℓ, r, λ) is defined
similarly. For convenience, write m := m(ℓ, r, λ). Letting one of the mixers in (ℓ, r, λ)
deviate to a pure strategy, this implies in particular that
v−1(ℓ+ 1, r, λ) =
m−1∑
s=0
(
m− 1
s
)
λs(1− λ)m−1−sf−1(ℓ+ 1 + s), (2.2)
v+1(ℓ, r + 1, λ) =
m−1∑
s=0
(
m− 1
s
)
λs(1− λ)m−1−sf+1((r + 1) + (m− 1− s))
=
m−1∑
s=0
(
m− 1
s
)
λs(1− λ)m−1−sf+1(r +m− s). (2.3)
For instance, a profile of type (ℓ+1, r, λ) is obtained from type (ℓ, r, λ) if a mixer switches
to pure strategy −1. In that case, there are m − 1 mixers left. To obtain expected
payoffs, notice that the probability that s ∈ {0, . . . , m − 1} of these mixers choose −1 is(
m−1
s
)
λs(1− λ)m−1−s. Using this notation, the Nash equilibria with at least one mixer are
characterized as follows.
Proposition 2.3.
(a) (Characterization of equilibrium) Let ℓ, r ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 2k+1} be such that ℓ+r <
2k + 1. Let λ ∈ (0, 1). A strategy profile of type (ℓ, r, λ) is a Nash equilibrium if and
only if
v−1(ℓ+ 1, r, λ) = v+1(ℓ, r + 1, λ). (2.4)
(b) (Equilibria with one mixer) There exist equilibria with exactly one mixer. These
equilibria are of type (k, k, λ) with arbitrary λ ∈ (0, 1), i.e., the mixer uses an ar-
bitrary mixed strategy, whereas the remaining 2k players are spread evenly over the
two pure strategies.
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(c) (Equilibria with more than one mixer) Let ℓ, r ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 2k + 1} be such that
ℓ+r ≤ 2k−1. There is a Nash equilibrium of type (ℓ, r, λ) if and only if max{ℓ, r} < k.
The corresponding probability λ ∈ (0, 1) solving (2.4) is unique.
Proof. (a): Condition (2.4) says that a mixer is indifferent between choosing −1, thereby
raising ℓ to ℓ+1 and obtaining payoff v−1(ℓ+1, r, λ), or choosing +1, thereby raising r to
r + 1 and obtaining payoff v+1(ℓ, r + 1, λ). Hence, (2.4) is a necessary condition for Nash
equilibrium.
To establish sufficiency, it remains to show that also players using a pure strategy — if
there are such players, i.e., if ℓ+ r ≥ 1 — choose a best reply. Suppose ℓ ≥ 1. The payoff
to a (−1)-player is v−1(ℓ, r, λ), while a unilateral deviation to +1 yields v+1(ℓ−1, r+1, λ).
However:
v−1(ℓ, r, λ) ≥ v−1(ℓ+ 1, r, λ) (2.5)
= v+1(ℓ, r + 1, λ) (2.6)
≥ v+1(ℓ− 1, r + 1, λ). (2.7)
Inequality (2.5) uses [Mon]: conditioning on the behavior of one of the m := m(ℓ, r, λ) > 0
mixers, write
v−1(ℓ, r, λ) = λv−1(ℓ+ 1, r, λ) + (1− λ)v−1(ℓ, r + 1, λ).
Then
v−1(ℓ, r, λ)− v−1(ℓ+ 1, r, λ) = (1− λ) [v−1(ℓ, r + 1, λ)− v−1(ℓ+ 1, r, λ)]
= (1− λ)
m−1∑
s=0
(
m− 1
s
)
λs(1− λ)m−1−s [f−1(ℓ+ s)− f−1(ℓ+ 1 + s)]
≥ 0
by [Mon]. Inequality (2.7) follows similarly and (2.6) is simply condition (2.4). So if ℓ ≥ 1,
(−1)-players choose a best reply. Similarly, if r ≥ 1, (+1)-players choose a best reply.
(b): Let λ ∈ (0, 1). Substitution in (2.4) and [Sym] yield that strategy profiles of type
(k, k, λ) are Nash equilibria:
v−1(k + 1, k, λ) = f−1(k + 1) = f+1(k + 1) = v+1(k, k + 1, λ).
Conversely, consider a Nash equilibrium of type (ℓ, r, λ) with exactly one mixer: ℓ+r = 2k.
We establish that ℓ = r. Suppose not. W.l.o.g., ℓ > r. Since ℓ + r = 2k, this implies
ℓ ≥ k + 1 and r ≤ k − 1. The expected payoff to a (−1)-player is
λf−1(ℓ+ 1) + (1− λ)f−1(ℓ),
7
while deviating to +1 would yield
λf+1(r + 1) + (1− λ)f+1(r + 2).
Since ℓ + 1 > r + 1, ℓ ≥ r + 2, and λ ∈ (0, 1), it follows from [Sym] and [Mon] that a
(−1)-player would benefit from unilateral deviation, contradicting the assumption that the
profile of type (ℓ, r, λ) is a Nash equilibrium. Conclude that ℓ = r.
(c): Without loss of generality, ℓ ≥ r, so max{ℓ, r} = ℓ. Let m = (2k + 1)− (ℓ + r) ≥ 2
be the number of mixers. By substitution, ℓ < k if and only if ℓ + 1 < r +m. To prove
(c), it therefore remains to establish three things.
Firstly, if ℓ + 1 < r +m, there is a λ ∈ (0, 1) solving (2.4). To see this, use ℓ ≥ r to
find that ℓ +m > r + 1. By [Sym] and [Mon], it follows that
v−1(ℓ+ 1, r, 0) = f−1(ℓ+ 1) > f+1(r +m) = v+1(ℓ, r + 1, 0),
v−1(ℓ+ 1, r, 1) = f−1(ℓ+m) < f+1(r + 1) = v+1(ℓ, r + 1, 1).
By the Intermediate Value Theorem applied to v−1(ℓ + 1, r, ·)− v+1(ℓ, r + 1, ·), there is a
λ ∈ (0, 1) solving (2.4): there is a Nash equilibrium of type (ℓ, r, λ).
Secondly, this λ ∈ (0, 1) solving (2.4) is unique. By (2.2), v−1(ℓ + 1, r, ·) is the ex-
pectation of a strictly decreasing function of a binomial stochastic variable. By stochastic
dominance (see Appendix A), this makes v−1(ℓ+1, r, ·), the left-hand side of (2.4), strictly
decreasing in λ. Similarly, by (2.3), the right-hand side of (2.4) is strictly increasing in
λ. Conclude that the functions v−1(ℓ + 1, r, ·) and v+1(ℓ, r + 1, ·) intersect at most once.
By the previous step, as long as ℓ + 1 < r +m, they intersect at least once, establishing
uniqueness.
Thirdly, if ℓ + 1 ≥ r +m, there is no λ ∈ (0, 1) solving (2.4). To see this, notice that
the inequality implies
ℓ+m > · · · > ℓ+ 2 > ℓ+ 1 ≥ r +m > r +m− 1 > · · · > r + 1,
so by [Sym] and [Mon]:
f−1(ℓ+m) < · · · < f−1(ℓ+2) < f−1(ℓ+1) ≤ f+1(r+m) < f+1(r+m−1) < · · · < f+1(r+1).
Substitution in (2.2) and (2.3) yields that
v+1(ℓ, r + 1, λ) > v−1(ℓ+ 1, r, λ)
for all λ ∈ (0, 1): there is no solution to (2.4). 
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Some consequences of this characterization of the game’s non-pure Nash equilibria:
(i): There are no Nash equilibria where the number of mixers is two, since in that case,
max{ℓ, r} ≥ k.
(ii): Substitution in (2.4) gives that a strategy profile in which the number of (−1)-players
is equal to the number of (+1)-players and the remaining players mix with probability 1/2,
i.e., a profile of type (t, t, 1/2) with t ∈ {0, . . . , k}, is a Nash equilibrium.
Having characterized the set of Nash equilibria, we now establish that the set of Nash
equilibria with at most one mixer is connected.
Proposition 2.4. The set of Nash equilibria with at most one mixer is connected.
Proof. In a Nash equilibrium with exactly one mixer, the completely mixed strategy is
arbitrary. Letting the probability go to zero or one, this line piece of Nash equilibria in the
strategy space has a pure Nash equilibrium as its end point. Hence, to show connectedness,
it suffices to show that for each pair of pure Nash equilibria, there is a chain of pure Nash
equilibria differing in exactly one coordinate connecting them.
So let x and y be distinct pure Nash equilibria. By Proposition 2.1, the majority action,
i.e., the action chosen by exactly k+1 players in a given Nash equilibrium, is well-defined.
We need to consider two cases. Firstly, if this action is the same in x and y, w.l.o.g. −1,
then x 6= y implies that the (k + 1)-player majorities in x and y must be distinct. Let i
be such a majority player, choosing −1 in x, but +1 in y. Secondly, if the majority action
is different in x and y, w.l.o.g. −1 in x and +1 in y, then by definition of a majority,
the (k + 1)-player majorities in x and y have a nonempty intersection. Again, let i be a
majority player choosing −1 in x, but +1 in y.
By construction, as i is a majority player, the path of Nash equilibria in which i
increases the probability of playing the action +1 from 0 to 1 connects x to another pure
Nash equilibrium x∗ with xi 6= x
∗
i = yi and x
∗
j = yj for all j 6= i, i.e., with a strictly smaller
Hamming distance to y (recall that the Hamming distance between two finite-dimensional
vectors is the number of coordinates in which they differ).
As the strategy vectors have only finitely many coordinates and we can reduce the
Hamming distance between pure Nash equilibria by the procedure above, the result now
follows by induction. 
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3 The replicator dynamic
In this section, we study the replicator dynamic (e.g. Weibull, 1995) for the minority
game. There is a set N = {1, . . . , 2k+1} of populations, where each population is the unit
interval [0, 1]. The populations represent the 2k+1 player positions in the minority game.
All agents in a population are initially programmed to some pure strategy. Hence, each
population can be divided into two subpopulations (one of which may contain no agents),
one for each of the pure strategies in the minority game. A population state is a vector
α = (α1, . . . , α2k+1) in the polyhedron of mixed-strategy profiles, where for each i ∈ N ,
αi is a point in the simplex ∆(Ai), representing the distribution of agents in population
i across the different pure strategies. The vector αi ∈ ∆(Ai) thus represents the state of
population i, with αi(ai) denoting the proportion of agents programmed to play the pure
strategy ai ∈ Ai.
Time is continuous and indexed by t. Agents – one from each population – are con-
tinuously drawn uniformly at random from these populations to play the minority game.
Suppose payoffs represent the effect of playing the game on an agent’s fitness, measured as
the number of offspring per time unit, and that each offspring inherits its single parent’s
strategy. This gives rise to the following dynamics for the population shares:
∀i ∈ N, ∀ai ∈ Ai : α˙i(ai) = αi(ai)(ui(ai, α−i)− ui(αi, α−i)). (3.1)
This system of differential equations defines the (continuous time multipopulation) repli-
cator dynamic. In words, the growth rate α˙i(ai)/αi(ai) of a pure strategy ai ∈ Ai in
population i ∈ N is equal to the difference in payoffs of the pure strategy and the cur-
rent average payoffs for the population. Hence, the population shares of strategies that
do better than average will grow, while the shares of the other strategies will decline. It
is easily seen that the subpopulations associated with the pure best replies to the current
population state have the highest growth rates.
The system of differential equations (3.1) defines a continuous solution mapping ξ :
R ×
(
×i∈N∆(Ai)
)
→ ×i∈N∆(Ai) which assigns to each time t ∈ R and each initial state
α0 ∈ ×i∈N∆(Ai) the population state ξ(t, α
0) ∈ ×i∈N∆(Ai). The (solution) trajectory
through a population state α0 ∈ ×i∈N∆(Ai) is the graph of the solution mapping ξ(·, α
0).
A population state α ∈ ×i∈N∆(Ai) is a stationary state of the replicator dynamics (3.1)
if and only if for each population i ∈ N every pure strategy ai ∈ Ai that is used by some
agents in the population gives the same payoffs. In that case, α˙i(ai) = 0 for all i ∈ N and all
ai ∈ Ai. Let S = {α ∈ ×j∈N∆(Aj) | ∀i ∈ N, ∀ai ∈ Ai : α˙i(ai) = 0} be the set of stationary
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states. By definition, if α ∈ S, then a player i ∈ N either uses a pure strategy or — if he is
a mixer — is indifferent between his two pure strategies: ui(ai, α−i) = ui(αi, α−i) for both
ai ∈ Ai. Using the proof of Lemma 2.2, all mixers must use the same strategy. If there
is more than one mixer, the proof of Proposition 2.3(c) indicates that this mixed strategy
solving (2.4) is uniquely determined by the number of players choosing pure strategy −1
and pure strategy +1. Conclude that the set of stationary states can be partitioned into
three subsets:
S1: The connected set of Nash equilibria with at most one mixer;
and a finite collection of isolated stationary states, namely
S2: Nash equilibria with more than one mixer;
S3: nonequilibrium profiles of some type (ℓ, r, λ), where

ℓ, r ∈ {0, . . . , 2k + 1},
ℓ+ r ≤ 2k + 1,
if ℓ+ r < 2k + 1, then λ ∈ (0, 1) uniquely determined by (2.4).
It remains to study the stability properties of these stationary states. We consider Lya-
punov stability and asymptotic stability. Roughly speaking, a population state is Lyapunov
stable if no small change in the population shares can lead the replicator dynamics away
from the population state, while a population state is asymptotically stable if it is Lyapunov
stable and any sufficiently small change in the population shares results in a movement
back to the original population state. Formally, a population state α ∈ ×i∈N∆(Ai) is
Lyapunov stable if every neighborhood B of α contains a neighborhood B0 of α such that
ξ(t, α0) ∈ B for every x0 ∈ B ∩ ×i∈N∆(Ai) and t ≥ 0. It is asymptotically stable if it is
Lyapunov stable, and, in addition, there exists a neighborhood B∗ such that
lim
t→∞
ξ(t, α0) = α
for each initial state α0 ∈ B∗ ∩ ×i∈N∆(Ai).
The analysis relies heavily on the existence of a Lyapunov function for the replica-
tor dynamic in the minority game. Tercieux and Voorneveld (2005), using Thm. 3.1 in
Monderer and Shapley (1996), show that a minority game is a (finite exact) potential game:
there exists a real-valued (so-called potential) function U on the pure strategy space such
that for each i ∈ N , each a−i ∈ ×j∈N\{i}Aj, and all ai, bi ∈ Ai:
ui(ai, a−i)− ui(bi, a−i) = U(ai, a−i)− U(bi, a−i). (3.2)
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Taking expectations, (3.2) can be extended to mixed strategies, so the payoff difference in
(3.1) equals the corresponding change in the potential. Hence, the replicator dynamic can
be rewritten as:
∀i ∈ N, ∀ai ∈ Ai : α˙i(ai) = αi(ai)(U(ai, α−i)− U(αi, α−i)). (3.3)
This makes the potential U a Lyapunov function of the replicator dynamic. More precisely:
Proposition 3.1. The potential function U of the minority game is a strict Lyapunov func-
tion for the replicator dynamic: for each solution trajectory (α(t))t∈[0,∞), dU(α(t))/dt ≥ 0
with equality exactly in the stationary states.
Proof. Suppressing time indices for ease of notation, direct calculation gives
U˙(α) =
∑
i∈N
∑
ai∈Ai
U(ai, α−i)α˙i(ai)
=
∑
i∈N
∑
ai∈Ai
αi(ai)(U(ai, α−i)− U(αi, α−i))U(ai, α−i)
=
∑
i∈N
∑
ai∈Ai
(
αi(ai)U(ai, α−i)
2 − U(αi, α−i)
2
)
=
∑
i∈N
(
Eαi
[
U(ai, α−i)
2
]
− (Eαi [U(ai, α−i)])
2)
=
∑
i∈N
VarαiU(ai, α−i)
≥ 0,
with equality if and only if all variances are zero, i.e., if and only if α is a stationary point
of the replicator dynamics. 
Proposition 3.2. The collection of Nash equilibria with at most one mixer in S1 is asymp-
totically stable under the replicator dynamic. Stationary states in S2 and S3 are not Lya-
punov stable.
Proof. To see that the collection of Nash equilibria in S1 is asymptotically stable, notice
that S1 is the set of global maxima of U : The potential U in (3.2) was extended to mixed
strategies by taking expectations, so U achieves a global maximum in a pure strategy
profile which, again by (3.2), is a pure Nash equilibrium. By symmetry, all pure Nash
equilibria are global maxima of U and so are equilibria with exactly one mixer. Other
strategy profiles are not global maxima of U : they are not Nash equilibria or, if they are,
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they involve more than one mixer, in which case they put positive probability also on pure
strategy profiles that are not Nash equilibria and consequently not global maxima of U .
This connected set of global maxima of the Lyapunov function U is asymptotically stable
(Weibull, 1995, Thm. 6.4).
We show that elements of S2 are not Lyapunov stable; the case for points in S3 is
similar. Let α∗ ∈ S2, i.e, α
∗ is a Nash equilibrium with more than one mixer. Suppose
it is Lyapunov stable. Since it is an isolated point of the collection of stationary states,
there is a neighborhood B of α∗ whose closure contains only the stationary state α∗:
cl(B) ∩ S2 = {α
∗}. By Lyapunov stability, as long as the initial state α(0) lies in a
sufficiently small neighborhood B′ of α∗, the entire solution trajectory (α(t))t∈[0,∞) remains
in B.
Let i ∈ N be one of the mixers in the Nash equilibrium α∗. Since i is indifferent between
his two pure strategies and the potential U measures payoff differences, it follows that
U(α∗) = U(−1, α∗−i) = U(+1, α
∗
−i).
Consequently, U(γi, α
∗
−i) = U(α
∗) for all mixed strategies γi of player i. For γi 6= α
∗
i suf-
ficiently close to α∗i , it follows that (γi, α
∗
−i) ∈ B
′. Hence, the entire solution trajectory
(γ(t))t∈[0,∞) with γ(0) := (γi, α
∗
−i) remains in B. Since its starting point is not stationary,
Proposition 3.1 implies that the Lyapunov function U strictly increases along the trajec-
tory, until it may reach a stationary state. Let γ∗ ∈ ×j∈N∆(Aj) be a limit point of the
trajectory (γ(t))t∈[0,∞): there is a strictly increasing sequence of time points tm → ∞
such that limm→∞ γ(tm) → γ
∗. Such a limit point exists and has to be a stationary point
(Lemma A.1 of Sandholm, 2001, p. 104). Since cl(B) ∩ S2 = {α
∗} and the trajectory lies
in B, it follows that γ∗ = α∗. But then limm→∞ U(γ(tm)) = U(α
∗) = U(γ(0)), contra-
dicting that the Lyapunov function is increasing along the trajectory. Conclude that α∗
cannot be Lyapunov stable. For α∗ ∈ S3, proceed similarly. As it is not a NE, some i can
profitably deviate slightly (to remain inside B′), so the remaining trajectory must increase
the potential, but still have α∗ as its limit point. 
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4 Perturbed best-response dynamics and quantal re-
sponse equilibria
4.1 Perturbed best-response dynamics
Under stochastic fictitious play (e.g. Hofbauer and Hopkins, 2005; Hofbauer and Sandholm,
2002; Hopkins, 2002), players repeatedly play a normal form game (in discrete time). They
choose best replies to their beliefs on other players’ actions on the basis of a perturbed
payoff function, with beliefs determined by the time average of past play. More specifically,
the state variable at time t ∈ N is a vector Zt ∈ ×i∈N∆(Ai), where the ith component
Zti denotes the time average of player i’s past play up to time t. Players’ initial choices
are arbitrary pure strategies; in later periods players best-respond to their beliefs Zt, after
their payoffs have been subjected to random shocks. That is, for each i ∈ N , let (εai )a∈Ai
be a vector of payoff disturbances. The vector of payoff disturbances is independent and
identically distributed across players and over time. Let α−i ∈ ×j∈N\{i}∆(Aj) be a belief.
The probability that player i chooses action ai ∈ Ai is equal to the probability that
ui(ai, α−i) + ε
ai
i ≥ ui(bi, α−i) + ε
bi
i
for all bi ∈ Ai. Then, the perturbed best-response dynamics associated with Gumbel-
distributed perturbations with parameter β > 0 is:
∀i ∈ N, ∀ai ∈ Ai : α˙i(ai) =
exp [βui(ai, α−i)]∑
bi∈Ai
exp [βui(bi, α−i)]
− αi(ai). (4.1)
Gumbel-distributed payoff perturbations correspond to control costs of the relative entropy
form. By Proposition 4.1 of Hofbauer and Sandholm (2002), the process in (4.1) has a strict
Lyapunov function that can be expressed in terms of the potential function and the control
cost functions. For each i ∈ N , let αi denote the probability with which player i chooses
the action ai = −1. Then, the Lyapunov function for the process in (4.1) is defined by:
α ∈ ×i∈N∆(Ai) : V (α) = U(α)−
1
β
∑
i∈N
[αi log(αi) + (1− αi) log(1− αi)] , (4.2)
where U is the potential function. Since control cost functions of the relative entropy form
satisfy the smoothness conditions of Proposition 4.2 of Hofbauer and Sandholm (2002), it
follows that:
Proposition 4.1. The collection of stationary states and recurrent points of the process
in (4.1) coincide.
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Theorem 6.1(iii) of Hofbauer and Sandholm (2002) now implies that the perturbed
best-response dynamic converges to these stationary states. Notice that the set of sta-
tionary states coincides with the set of logit quantal response equilibria of the minority
game (McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995). When the perturbation terms go to zero, we obtain
Nash equilibria. As the set of Nash equilibria is not finite, we cannot apply Corollary
6.6 of Bena¨ım (1999) to characterize the subset of Nash equilibria to which the stochastic
process (4.1) converges. The set of Nash equilibria that are the limit points of a sequence
of logit quantal response equilibria is generally hard to characterize. In the next section,
we characterize this set for the three-player minority game.
4.2 Stationary points for the three-player minority game
Consider the three-player minority game with f−1 = f+1 = f strictly decreasing in
the number of users. As it involves a simple rescaling of functions satisfying [Mon] and
[Sym], we may without loss of generality set f(2) = 0 and f(1) − f(3) = 1. A potential
of the game is then given in Figure 4.1. The Nash equilibria of the three-player game
−1 +1
−1 −1 0
+1 0 0
−1 +1
−1 0 0
+1 0 −1
Figure 4.1: A potential function of the 3-player minority game
follow easily from the results in Section 2.2. Throughout this section, Nash equilibria are
denoted by (p, q, r) ∈ [0, 1]3, where p, q, r are the probabilities with which player 1, 2, and
3, respectively, choose −1. Then, the Nash equilibria of the game are (1/2, 1/2, 1/2) and
(1, 0, λ) for some λ ∈ [0, 1], and permutations of these.
Given parameter β ≥ 0, the conditions for a logit quantal response equilibrium (QRE)
become:
p =
1
1 + exp−β(1− q − r)
, (4.3)
q =
1
1 + exp−β(1− p− r)
, (4.4)
r =
1
1 + exp−β(1− p− q)
. (4.5)
Given β ≥ 0, we denote a logit QRE in which player 1,2 and 3 play −1 with probability
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p, q, r by (p, q, r, β). We now characterize the set of Nash equilibria that are the limit of a
sequence of quantal response equilibria when β →∞.
Proposition 4.2. Let (p(βn), q(βn), r(βn), βn)n∈N be a sequence of logit quantal response
equilibria: βn → ∞ and for each n ∈ N, the quadruple (p(βn), q(βn), r(βn), βn) solves
equations (4.3)-(4.5). A Nash equilibrium (p, q, r) is the limit of such a sequence if and
only if one of the following conditions hold:
(a) (p, q, r) is a pure Nash equilibrium,
(b) (p, q, r) is a Nash equilibrium with exactly one mixer who mixes uniformly,
(c) (p, q, r) = (1/2, 1/2, 1/2).
The proof is in Appendix B. Proposition 4.2 thus characterizes the set of stationary points
of the perturbed best response dynamics (4.1) for the three-player minority game.
5 Best-reply learning with limited memory
In this section, we consider discrete time learning models in which players choose best
replies to beliefs that are supported by observed play in the recent past. We study two such
models, the learning model proposed by Hurkens (1995) and the model of Kets and Voorneveld
(2005). First, in the learning model of Hurkens, players may choose any action that is a
best reply to some belief over other players’ actions that is consistent with their recent
past play. The limiting behavior of this learning process is easy to characterize. Hurkens
shows that the Markov processes defined by his learning process eventually settle down in
so-called minimal curb sets (Basu and Weibull, 1991). Minimal curb sets are product sets
of pure strategies containing all best responses against beliefs restricted to the recommen-
dations to the remaining players. Unfortunately, this does not provide a sharp prediction
in the minority game. As shown by Tercieux and Voorneveld (2005), the unique minimal
curb set in the minority game consists of the entire strategy space. That is, over time, all
players will keep on choosing both actions.
Secondly, we study the model of Kets and Voorneveld (2005). As in the model of
Hurkens (1995), it is assumed that players best-respond to beliefs over others’ play sup-
ported by recent past play. In addition, players display a so-called recency bias: when there
are multiple best replies to a given belief, a player chooses the best reply that he most re-
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cently played.3 Kets and Voorneveld show that play converges to one of the minimal prep
sets of the game under this learning process. Minimal prep sets (Voorneveld, 2004) are a
set-valued solution concept for strategic games that combines a standard rationality con-
dition, stating that the set of recommended strategies to each player must contain at least
one best reply to whatever belief he may have that is consistent with the recommendations
to the other players, with players’ aim at simplicity, which encourages them to maintain
a set of strategies that is as small as possible. Think of the set of recommendations to a
player in a minimal prep set as a well-packed suitcase for a holiday: you want to be pre-
pared for different kinds of weather, but bringing all five of your umbrellas and all seven
bathing suits may be overdoing it. Tercieux and Voorneveld (2005) show that the minimal
prep sets of the minority game and the pure Nash equilibria of the game coincide. Hence,
under the learning model of Kets and Voorneveld, play in the minority game converges to
one of the pure Nash equilibria of the game.
In both the model of Hurkens (1995) and Kets and Voorneveld (2005), players need to
recall a sufficiently long period of play in order for play to converge. We now turn to the
question what this lower bound on players’ memory is. More specifically, suppose players
remember actions that were chosen during the past T ∈ N periods. A memory length
of T = 1 is clearly insufficient for a best-reply learning process with limited memory to
converge. If players chose an action profile yesterday that is not a pure Nash equilibrium,
then some action, say −1, was chosen by more than k + 1 players. Hence, everyone
chooses the unique best reply +1 today, and consequently the unique best reply −1 to this
tomorrow, and the unique best reply +1 to this the day after tomorrow, with action profiles
forever cycling between these two extremes. However, we show that a memory length T = 2
is sufficient for the learning process of Kets and Voorneveld (2005) to convergence to pure
Nash equilibria.
When the memory length T is equal to 2, the process is a Markov chain with state
space H = {(a1, a2) | a1, a2 ∈ A2k+1}, where a history h = (a1, a2) ∈ H indicates that
the 2k + 1 players remember that they chose action profile a1 one period ago and a2 two
periods ago. Having defined the set H of states, we proceed to the transition probability
functions P : H × H → [0, 1], where P (h, h′) ∈ [0, 1] is the probability of moving from
state h ∈ H to state h′ ∈ H in one period and
∑
h′∈H P (h, h
′) = 1 for all h ∈ H . We do
not need to specify exact probabilities: for the convergence result, only sign restrictions
3The behavioral economics literature provides several motivations for the common observation that
agents appear somewhat unwilling to deviate from their recent choices. This can be attributed to e.g. the
formation of habits (cf. Young, 1998) or the use of rules of thumb (cf. Ellison and Fudenberg, 1993).
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are needed.
Moving from h = (a1, a2) to h′ = (b1, b2) in one period means that h′ is obtained from
h after one more round of play, i.e., by appending a new profile of most recent actions.
Formally:
[P1] h′ = (b1, b2) is a successor of h = (a1, a2), i.e., b2 = a1.
Moreover, by moving from h = (a1, a2) to h′ = (b1, b2), the processes in Kets and Voorneveld
(2005) require that each player i ∈ N chooses a best reply to a belief α−i ∈ ×j∈N\{i}∆({a
1
j , a
2
j})
with support in the product set of actions chosen in the previous T = 2 periods, whenever
possible sticking to the most recent best reply. In games with just two actions, the latter
simply means that you continue playing as you did in the previous round, unless that
action is no longer a best reply to your current belief. Formally:
[P2] For each i ∈ N , b1i is a best reply to some belief α−i ∈ ×j∈N\{i}∆({a
1
j , a
2
j}). Moreover,
b1i = a
1
i if and only if a
1
i is a best reply to α−i.
Proposition 5.1. Consider a Markov chain on H with transition probability function P ,
where, for all states h, h′ ∈ H, it holds that P (h, h′) > 0 if and only if [P1] and [P2] are
true. This Markov process eventually settles down in a pure Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Let h0 = (a
1, a2) ∈ H and distinguish two cases:
Case 1: a1 is a pure Nash equilibrium. By [P2], the players will react with positive
probability to the belief that everybody plays as in a1. Each player’s most recent best
reply is to continue playing as in a1, so the process moves with positive probability to the
history h1 = (a
1, a1). From here on, the only feasible belief based on the past two periods
is that the players play a1 and the most recent best reply implies that they will continue to
play a1: the process stays in state h1 and play has converged to a pure Nash equilibrium.
Case 2: a1 is not a pure Nash equilibrium. By Proposition 2.1, some alternative,
w.l.o.g. −1, was chosen by a set S ⊆ N of players with |S| > k + 1. Each player’s unique
best response to a1 is therefore to choose +1. By [P2], the process moves with positive
probability to state h1 = ((+1, . . . ,+1), a
1). Let a∗ ∈ A2k+1 be a pure Nash equilibrium
where k + 1 members of S choose +1 and the others choose −1. Again using [P2], the
process moves with positive probability from h1 to h2 = (a
∗, (+1, . . . ,+1)):
• For each of the selected k+1 members of S, +1 is the unique best reply to the belief
drawn from the past two periods that at least k+1 other players from S will choose
−1.
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• For each of the remaining k players, −1 is the unique best response to the belief that
all other players will continue to play last period’s profile (+1, . . . ,+1).
Notice that history h2 belongs to case 1.
Conclude that, regardless of the initial state h0, the Markov process moves with posi-
tive probability to an absorbing state where the players continue to play one of the game’s
pure Nash equilibria. As the Markov process is finite and the initial state was chosen ar-
bitrarily, this will eventually happen with probability one (Kemeny and Snell, 1976): play
eventually settles down in a pure Nash equilibrium. 
Some remarks are in order. First, notice that, due to the symmetry of the minority game,
a minor revision of the proof indicates that convergence to pure Nash equilibria can be
established also if the only thing players remember from the past two periods is what
they chose themselves and how many others did so. This comes at the expense of a more
complex notation and a larger deviation from that of Kets and Voorneveld (2005).
Secondly, the result that the lower bound on players’ memory length is two indi-
cates that the requirement on memory length in Kets and Voorneveld (2005) for general
games can be decreased significantly in specific cases. Although the convergence result
in Kets and Voorneveld (2005) for the entire class of finite strategic games also applies
here, we include an explicit proof: the structure of a minority game allows us to give a
considerably shorter proof of the convergence result for this specific game, and allows us
to derive a much sharper bound on the memory length.
6 Concluding remarks
Though congestion games are apparently simple, game-theorists’ understanding of play
in such games is far from complete, for two reasons. Firstly, well-known learning mod-
els do not always provide equivocal predictions for such games. In this paper, we have
characterized the Nash equilibria and the limiting behavior of several well-known learning
models in a simple congestion game. We show that these learning models provide different
predictions. Secondly, experimental results are not always in line with theoretical predic-
tions. In experiments on market entry games, aggregate play is largely consistent with
equilibrium play, with the number of entrants close to capacity, but individual play gener-
ally does not resemble Nash play (see e.g. Ochs, 1999). Hence, an interesting direction for
future research would be to test behavior in minority games experimentally. This provides
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the opportunity to compare the performance of different learning models in the minority
game.4 Moreover, it may help to better understand behavior in other congestion games
such as the market entry games, as the symmetry of the game makes it harder for players
to play repeated-game strategies. In experiments on the (asymmetric) market entry games,
players sometimes seem to follow such strategies, with some players choosing to enter the
market in every round in the initial periods, regardless of payoffs, to obtain a reputation
for always entering (see Duffy and Hopkins, 2005, for a discussion). Such strategies are
useless in the minority game, so that it may be hoped that the minority game offers a
cleaner test of the theory.
Appendix A Stochastic dominance for binomial dis-
tributions
Let X have a binomial distribution with n ∈ N draws and success probability p ∈ [0, 1];
briefly, a B(n, p) distribution: X = X1 + · · · + Xn, where X1, . . . , Xn are i.i.d B(1, p).
Distributions with a higher success rate p stochastically dominate those with a lower one
(cf. Ross, 1996, Exc. 9.9). Formally, in terms of cumulative distributions, if p, q ∈ [0, 1]
and p < q, then
For all m ∈ {0, . . . , n} :
m∑
k=0
(
n
k
)
pk(1− p)n−k ≥
m∑
k=0
(
n
k
)
qk(1− q)n−k,
with strict inequality if m < n. This follows by substitution if m = 0 or m = n. So let
m ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1}. It suffices to show that the function
[0, 1] ∋ p 7→
m∑
k=0
(
n
k
)
pk(1− p)n−k
4Bottazzi and Devetag (2007) and Chmura and Pitz (2006) present experiments on the minority game.
However, their results cannot be directly used to compare the performance of different learning models, as
they do not test explicitly whether play converges to particular strategy profiles or to particular product
sets of actions. Both papers merely study the effect of information on players’ aggregate payoffs.
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has a negative derivative on (0, 1). The derivative, after rewriting, becomes
m∑
k=0
(
n
k
)[
kpk−1(1− p)n−k − (n− k)pk(1− p)n−k−1
]
=
m∑
k=0
(
n
k
)
pk−1(1− p)n−k−1 [k − np]
=
m∑
k=0
(
n
k
)
kpk−1(1− p)n−k−1 − n
m∑
k=0
(
n
k
)
pk(1− p)n−k−1
=
n
1− p
m−1∑
k=0
(
n− 1
k
)
pk(1− p)n−1−k −
n
1− p
m∑
k=0
(
n
k
)
pk(1− p)n−k
=
n
1− p
[
P
(
n−1∑
k=1
Xk ≤ m− 1
)
− P
(
n∑
k=1
Xk ≤ m
)]
.
Consider the term in square brackets. The first probability is strictly smaller than the
second, as the first event (at most m − 1 successes in the first n − 1 draws) implies the
second one (at most m successes during all n draws), whereas the latter also includes the
positive-probability event that
∑n−1
k=1 Xk = m. Hence, the derivative is negative, as we had
to show.
Write a function g : {0, 1, . . . , n} → R as the sum of indicator functions:
g = g(n)I{0,...,n} + (g(n− 1)− g(n))I{0,...,n−1} + · · ·+ (g(0)− g(1))I{0}
= g(n)I{0,...,n} +
n−1∑
k=0
(g(k)− g(k + 1))I{0,...,k}.
Then
E[g(X)] = g(n) +
n−1∑
k=0
(g(k)− g(k + 1))P(X ≤ k).
If g is nonconstant, nonincreasing, then g(k)− g(k + 1) ≥ 0 for all k = 0, . . . , n− 1, with
at least one strict inequality. As shown above, the cumulative probabilities are strictly
decreasing in the success probability p. So E[g(X)] becomes a strictly decreasing function
of p: the higher the probability of success, the larger the probability that g(X) achieves a
low value. Of course, for nondecreasing functions the converse holds.
Appendix B Proof of Proposition 4.2
The only Nash equilibria not covered by (a), (b), and (c) are those with one player
(w.l.o.g. player 1) choosing −1, one player (w.l.o.g. player 2) choosing +1, and the third
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player (w.l.o.g. player 3) mixing with probability λ ∈ (0, 1) \ {1
2
}.
Suppose, to the contrary, that such an equilibrium is the limit of a sequence of logit
QRE (p(βn), q(βn), r(βn), βn)n∈N where βn → ∞ and (p(βn), q(βn), r(βn), βn) solves equa-
tions (4.3) to (4.5) for a logit QRE. In the selected equilibrium, both the (−1)-player and
the (+1)-player choose their unique best response. By Lemma 3 in Turocy (2005, p. 251),
βn(1 − p(βn)) → 0 and βnq(βn) → 0. Substituting this in the logit QRE condition (4.5)
for the third player gives that
r(βn) =
1
1 + exp−βn(1− p(βn)− q(βn))
→
1
2
,
contradicting the assumption that limn→∞ r(βn) = λ 6= 1/2.
It remains to show that the classes of equilibria in the proposition are indeed limits of a
sequence of logit QREs.
(a): By symmetry, it suffices to show that the pure Nash equilibrium (p, q, r) = (1, 1, 0) is
the limit of a sequence of logit QREs.
Step 1: For each β > 4 there is a logit QRE (p, q, r, β) with p = q ∈ (1/2, 1), and r < 1/2.
Proof of Step 1: Based on conditions (4.3) - (4.5) for a logit QRE and the substitution
p = q, define for all β > 0 and p ∈ [1/2, 1]:
r(p, β) :=
1
1 + exp[−β(1− 2p)]
,
f(p, β) :=
1
1 + exp[−β(1− p− r(p, β))]
.
Let β > 4. We show that there is a solution p∗ ∈ (1/2, 1] to the equation p = f(p, β).
Substitution in (4.3) - (4.5) yields that (p, q, r, β) = (p∗, p∗, r(p∗, β), β) is a logit QRE with
the desired properties. Notice that
∂f(p, β)
∂p
=
−β exp (−β(1− p− r(p, β)))
(1 + exp (−β(1− p− r(p, β))))2
(
1 +
∂r(p, β)
∂p
)
,
=
−β exp (−β(1− p− r(p, β)))
(1 + exp (−β(1− p− r(p, β0))))
2
(
1 +
−2β exp (−β(1− 2p))
(1 + exp (−β(1− 2p)))2
)
.
Since f(1/2, β) = 1/2 and
∂f(1/2, β)
∂p
= −
β
4
(
2− β
2
)
> 1
for β > 4, it follows that f(p, β) > p for p slightly larger than 1/2. Moreover, f(1, β) < 1.
Hence, by the Intermediate Value Theorem applied to f(·, β), f(p∗, β) = p∗ for some
p∗ ∈ (1/2, 1).
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Step 2: Let β0 > 4 and let p0 ∈ (1/2, 1) solve f(p0, β0) = p0. This is possible by Step 1.
The function f(p0, ·) is strictly increasing on [β0,∞).
Proof of Step 2: By definition of f , it suffices to show that the derivative of
β 7→ β(1− p0 − r(p0, β)), β ∈ [β0,∞)
is positive. This derivative equals
− β
∂r(p0, β)
∂β
+ 1− p0 − r(p0, β). (B.1)
Using p0 > 1/2 and the definition of r, it follows that ∂r(p0, β)/∂β < 0, i.e., the function
r(p0, ·) is strictly decreasing on [β0,∞). Moreover, as p0 = f(p0, β0) > 1/2, it follows from
the definition of f that 1 − p0 − r(p0, β0) > 0. As r(p0, ·) is decreasing, this implies that
1− p0 − r(p0, β) > 0 for each β ∈ [β0,∞). Therefore, the expression in (B.1) is positive.
Step 3: The pure Nash equilibrium (p, q, r) = (1, 1, 0) is the limit of a sequence of QREs.
Proof of Step 3: Let β0 > 4 and consider a QRE (p0, q0, r0, β0) as in Step 1. Set
β1 = β0 + 1. By Step 2, p0 = f(p0, β0) < f(p0, β1). Moreover, f(1, β1) < 1. By the
Intermediate Value Theorem applied to the function f(·, β1), there is a p1 ∈ (p0, 1) with
p1 = f(p1, β1). Conclude that there is a QRE (p1, q1, r1, β1) with
p1 = q1 = f(p1, β1) > p0,
r1 = r(p1, β1)
β1 = β0 + 1
Repeating this construction allows us to define a sequence (pn, qn, rn, βn)n∈N of solutions
to (4.3) - (4.5) satisfying the conditions of Step 1 and with βn → ∞ and (pn)n∈N strictly
increasing.
As (pn, qn, rn)n∈N is a sequence in the compact strategy space, we may assume w.l.o.g.
that the sequence converges. Its limit (p, q, r) must be a Nash equilibrium (McKelvey and Palfrey,
1995). As (pn)n∈N is a strictly increasing sequence in (1/2, 1) and (rn)n∈N is a sequence in
(0, 1/2), it must be p = q > 1/2 and r ≤ 1/2. The only Nash equilibrium of the game with
these properties is (p, q, r) = (1, 1, 0).
(b): By symmetry, it suffices to show that the Nash equilibrium (p, q, r) = (1, 0, 1/2) is
the limit of a sequence of logit QREs. The steps are similar to those in (a). Therefore, the
proof is kept short.
Step 1: For each β > 4 there is a logit QRE (p, q, r, β) with p ∈ (1/2, 1), q = 1−p, r = 1/2.
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Proof of Step 1: Let β > 4. Based on the substitution q = 1−p and r = 1/2 in condition
(4.3) for a logit QRE, define
g(p, β) :=
1
1 + exp [β(1/2− p)]
.
We show that there is a solution p∗ ∈ (1/2, 1) to the equation p = g(p, β). Substitution in
(4.3) - (4.5) yields that (p, q, r, β) = (p∗, 1− p∗, 1/2, β), β) is a logit QRE with the desired
properties. Notice that
∂g(p, β)
∂p
=
β exp [β(1/2− p)]
(1 + exp β(1/2− p))2
.
Since g(1/2, β) = 1/2 and ∂g(1/2, β)/∂p = β/4 > 1, it follows that g(p, β) > p for p
slightly larger than 1/2. Moreover, g(1, β) < 1, so the Intermediate Value Theorem implies
that g(p∗, β) = p∗ for some p∗ ∈ (1/2, 1).
Step 2: For each p0 ∈ (1/2, 1), the function g(p0, ·) is strictly increasing on (0,∞).
Proof of Step 2: Immediate from the definition of g.
Step 3: The Nash equilibrium (p, q, r) = (1, 0, 1/2) is the limit of a sequence of logit
QREs.
Proof of Step 3: Reasoning as in the proof of step 3 in part (a) allows us to construct
a sequence (pn, qn, rn, βn)n∈N of solutions to (4.3) - (4.5) satisfying the conditions of Step
1 and with βn → ∞ and (pn)n∈N strictly increasing. As (pn, qn, rn)n∈N is a sequence in
the compact strategy space, we may assume w.l.o.g. that the sequence converges. Its
limit (p, q, r) must be a Nash equilibrium (McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995). As (pn)n∈N is a
strictly increasing sequence in (1/2, 1), qn = 1− pn and rn = 1/2 for all n ∈ N, it must be
p > 1/2, q = 1− p, r = 1/2. The only Nash equilibrium of the game with these properties
is (p, q, r) = (1, 0, 1/2).
(c): It follows by substitution that (p, q, r, β) = (1/2, 1/2, 1/2, β) is a logit QRE for all
β ≥ 0. Consequently, the Nash equilibrium (p, q, r) = (1/2, 1/2, 1/2) is the limit of a
sequence of logit QREs with β →∞.
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